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DIGGING DEEPER TO PROTECT TRIBAL PROPERTY
INTERESTS: UNITED STATES v. OSAGE WIND, LLC
Allison B. Christian*
I. Introduction
“If the first reading does not produce a result in favor of the Indians, you
should read the document again. And once again – with an inventive
mind.”1 These words, spoken by Indian law scholar Charles F. Wilkinson,
reflect the established notion that laws passed for the benefit of Indian
tribes should be “liberally construed.”2 If any ambiguities remain in the
law, they should be resolved in favor of the Indian tribes. 3 This view is
embedded in the Indian canons of construction, 4 and these tools of statutory
interpretation have proven useful for courts faced with Indian law
dilemmas. 5 Could it be possible, however, for courts to abuse these tools to
create ambiguity in the law where it does not exist? The Tenth Circuit was
recently criticized for doing just that.
In United States v. Osage Wind, LLC, the Tenth Circuit relied on the
Indian canons of construction to unanimously hold that a wind developer’s
excavation practices “constituted ‘mining’ under the pertinent federal
regulations.”6 Because the developer’s actions constituted mining, the court
held that the developer should have obtained a mineral lease from the
subsurface estate owner, the Osage Nation (“the Tribe”). 7 Importantly,
however, because the Tribe pursued damages instead of an injunction, the

* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. David M. Blurton, Canons of Construction, Stare Decisis and Dependent Indian
Communities: A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 37, 39 (1999) (quoting Indian
law scholar Charles F. Wilkinson).
2. Id. at 42.
3. Id.
4. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Wind Energy Association in Support of
Petitioners at 3-4, United States v. Osage Wind, LLC, 871 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2017) (No.
17-1237), 2018 WL 1666871, at *3–4.
5. Id.
6. 871 F.3d 1078, 1081 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (mem.).
7. Id.
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wind farm operates in full force in Osage County, Oklahoma, producing
enough power for 45,000 homes. 8
Although members of the wind industry have criticized the Tenth Circuit
for relying too heavily on the Indian canons of construction 9 in United
States v. Osage Wind, LLC, the court struck an ideal balance between the
rights of surface owners and the interests of Indian mineral owners. The
Supreme Court’s denial of the wind developer’s petition for a writ of
certiorari in January of 2019 implicitly supports the view that the Tenth
Circuit was correct in reaching its holding. 10
This Note assesses United States v. Osage Wind, LLC and its effects by
considering two points of analysis: (1) whether the court correctly used the
canons to protect the Tribe’s property rights to find the backfill constituted
real property belonging to the Tribe; and (2) how the implications of the
ruling will apply to future projects. Part II provides the legal and factual
background behind the Tenth Circuit decision. Part III discusses the holding
and the court’s rationale, and Part IV analyzes how the Tenth Circuit
protected the Tribe’s property rights. Part V evaluates the effects of this
decision on developers and surface owners, while Part VI concludes the
discussion and reiterates the significance of this decision for Indian tribes
and the wind industry.
II. Background
A. Legal Landscape
The United States Congress established a reservation for the Osage
Nation in 1872 by granting the Tribe a tract of land in Osage County,
Oklahoma.11 After negotiations with the Tribe, Congress severed the Osage
Nation’s surface estate from the mineral estate in 1906 through the Osage
Act. 12 The Act allotted the surface estate to individual tribal members,13 and
each Osage member on the 1906 roll received over 650 acres of land. 14 The
8. Another Indian Law Case in Limbo as High Court Turns to Trump Again,
INDIANZ.COM (May 14, 2018), https://www.indianz.com/News/2018/05/14/another-indianlaw-case-in-limbo-as-high.asp.
9. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Wind Energy Association in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 10.
10. Osage Wind, 871 F.3d 1078.
11. Id. at 1082 (citing Act of June 5, 1872, ch. 310, 17 Stat. 228).
12. Id. (citing Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 3572, §§ 2–3, 34 Stat. 539, 540-44).
13. Id. (citing Act of June 28, 1906, § 2, 34 Stat. at 540–43).
14. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.07, at 315 (Nell Jessup Newton et
al. eds., 2005).
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mineral estate, however, was held in trust for the benefit of the Tribe. 15
Tribal members on the 1906 roll and their heirs received “headrights,”
which granted them the right to obtain income from the mineral estate. 16
Today, the Osage Nation is the beneficial owner of the 1.47 million acre
mineral estate.17
Despite the Tribe’s retention of the mineral estate, the Act included a
special provision regarding surface owners that remains intact today. The
provision states that “except as herein provided, [each surface owner] shall
have the right to manage, control, and dispose of his or her lands the same
as any citizen of the United States.”18 Although it seems commonplace, this
provision ensures that surface owners retain full property rights to the land.
Additionally, there is another player in the equation: the federal
government. Although the Tribe retains the mineral rights, the federal
government still holds a stake in the land. The Osage Act reserved the
mineral estate for the benefit of the Tribe, but the Act appointed the United
States as the legal trustee of the estate. 19 The Osage Nation may issue
mineral leases for “all oil, gas, and other minerals,” but this power is
subject to the Secretary of the Interior’s approval. 20 Indeed, “no mining . . .
for any of said mineral or minerals shall be permitted . . . without the
written consent of the Secretary of the Interior.”21 This provision of the
Osage Act illustrates Congress’s intent to “maintain control over the more
valuable resources to prevent their improvident depletion by individual
trib[al] members.”22 The federal government’s continued presence in tribal
affairs is unfortunately an all-too-familiar feeling for tribes. Although tribes
are sovereign nations, the federal government often finds a way to maintain
an active role in tribal affairs, sometimes for perceived good, but other
times, for ill.
15. Osage Wind, 871 F.3d at 1082 (citing Act of June 28, 1906, § 3, 34 Stat. at 543–44).
16. Id.
17. Frequently Asked Questions, OSAGE NATION, https://www.osagenationnsn.gov/who-we-are/minerals-council/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Feb. 13,
2019).
18. Act of June 28, 1906, § 2, 34 Stat. at 542. Critics of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in
Osage Wind, such as the American Wind Energy Association, would later seize on this
provision, arguing that the court had infringed on the statutorily protected rights of surface
estate owners in Osage County. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Wind Energy
Association in Support of Petitioner, supra note 4, at 10.
19. Osage Wind, 871 F.3d at 1082.
20. Id.
21. Act of June 28, 1906, § 2, 34 Stat. at 543–44.
22. Millsap v. Andrus, 717 F.2d 1326, 1328 (10th Cir. 1983).
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Through its constitution, the Osage Nation created the Osage Minerals
Council and gave the council the authority to develop the mineral estate and
make decisions regarding daily operations.23 Presently, the Osage Minerals
Council consists of eight tribal members elected to serve as the governing
body for the mineral estate. 24
The federal government continually remains involved. The Department
of the Interior (DOI) has the power to make rules regarding tribal
minerals.25 The DOI controls federal lands and plays an important role in
formulating energy policy where resources involve the development of
mineral rights on public lands. 26 The DOI has exercised its rulemaking
power and enacted rules governing mineral leases on tribal lands. One rule
at issue in United States v. Osage Wind, LLC was 25 C.F.R. § 211.3, which
regulates the development of Indian mineral resources and sets forth the
definition of “mining.”27 Under 25 C.F.R. § 211.3, mining is defined as “the
science, technique, and business of mineral development including, but not
limited to: opencast work, underground work, and in-situ leaching directed
to severance and treatment of minerals.” 28
Although that definition initially appears fairly broad, not all activities
constitute mining. For instance, moving small amounts of materials does
not fall within the parameters of the definition. 29 If excavation activities use
less than 5000 cubic yards per year of “sand, gravel, pumice, cinders,
granite, building stone, limestone, clay or silt,” the actions are not
considered mining. 30 This distinction is important because under a different
federal regulation—25 C.F.R. § 214.7—the DOI requires a mineral lease
for actions that constitute mining. 31 This provision expressly states that
“[n]o mining or work of any nature will be permitted upon any tract of land
until a lease covering such tract . . . [is] approved by the Secretary of the
23. Minerals Council, OSAGE NATION, https://www.osagenation-nsn.gov/who-weare/minerals-council (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
24. Press Release, Fredericks Peebles & Morgan LLP, Osage Minerals Council Prevails
in Supreme Court in Case Which Determines That Enel Wind Farm Must Obtain a Minerals
Lease (Jan. 7, 2019) (on file with author).
25. Osage Wind, 871 F.3d at 1082.
26. JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 19 (4th ed.
2015).
27. Osage Wind, 871 F.3d at 1082.
28. 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 (2016) (emphasis added), quoted in Osage Wind, 871 F.3d at
1082.
29. 25 C.F.R. § 211.3.
30. Id.
31. Osage Wind, 871 F.3d at 1082 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 214.7 (2011)).
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Interior and delivered to the lessee.”32 As noted, a mineral lease is not
required if activities fall within the DOI exception for small amounts of
common materials. 33 The Tenth Circuit was forced to closely examine and
analyze each of these DOI regulations to reach its holding.
Beyond its application of the DOI regulations, the Tenth Circuit relied
heavily on the Indian canons of construction. These canons allow courts, in
certain contexts, to interpret statutes and treaties in favor of Indian tribes. 34
As a matter of practical application, the canons should be used only where
“the plain text of the document is unclear.”35 In line with this limiting
principle, the Supreme Court, along with other lower courts, has held that
the canons should not be used if there is no ambiguity in the law. 36 The
canons, though often referred to generally, consist of three discrete notions
of interpretation. 37 The first canon provides that terms should be liberally

32. 25 C.F.R. § 214.7, quoted in Osage Wind, 871 F.3d at 1082.
33. 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 (“[W]hen sand, gravel, pumice, cinders, granite, building stone,
limestone, clay or silt is the subject mineral, an enterprise is considered ‘mining’ only if the
extraction of such a mineral exceeds 5,000 cubic yards in any given year.”).
34. Tenth Circuit Takes Expansive View of the Definition of the Term “Mining,”
Holding Wind Farm Project Needs Permit Prior to Commencement of Excavation in Tribal
Mineral Estate, NAT’L LAW REV. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/tenth-circuit-takes-expansive-view-definition-term-mining-holding-wind-farm-project
[hereinafter Tenth Circuit Takes Expansive View of the Term “Mining”].
35. Barbara Moschovidis, Note, Osage Nation v. Irby: The Tenth Circuit Disregards
Legal Precedent to Strip Osage County of Its Reservation Status, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
189, 194 (2011-2012); see also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)
(“[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions
interpreted to their benefit . . . .”); Alaska Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89
(1918) (“[S]tatutes . . . are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in
favor of the Indians.”); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832) (“If words be
made use of which are susceptible of a more extended meaning than their plain import, as
connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should be considered as used only in the latter
sense.”); Millsap v. Andrus, 717 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1983) (“If there were any doubt
as to the congressional meaning of ‘other minerals,’ that rule mandates that it be read as
incorporating the broad definition . . . .”).
36. See South Carolina v. Catawaba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498, 506 (1986) (“The
canon of construction regarding the resolution of ambiguities in favor of Indians, however,
does not permit reliance on ambiguities that do not exist . . . .”); Penobscot Nation v. Mills,
861 F.3d 324, 329 n.3 (1st Cir. 2017) (stating that “it would be an error of law to apply the
[Indian] canon” where “the plain meaning” of statutory text leaves “no ambiguities to
resolve in favor of” a tribe); King Mountain Tobacco Co. v. McKenna, 768 F.3d 989, 998
(9th Cir. 2014) (noting that a court may not invoke a canon to find “ambiguities that do not
exist”).
37. Blurton, supra note 1, at 42.
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construed in the light most favorable to the Indian tribes. 38 The second
requires courts to resolve textual ambiguity in favor of the Indian tribes. 39
The third canon instructs courts to interpret terms as the Indian tribes would
have understood them at the time. 40
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Osage Wind, LLC41 utilized the
canons, the DOI’s regulations, and applicable tribal law to reach its holding
after a wind developer sought to build a wind farm on land in Osage
County, Oklahoma. Because the Osage Nation retained the mineral estate,
25 C.F.R §§ 211.3 and 214.7 were especially important in the court’s
analysis concerning the litigation between the wind developer and the
Tribe. The court used the canons of construction to further clarify these
regulations.
B. Background of the Case
Their vast, undeveloped, rural acreage makes tribal lands a prime choice
for wind developers searching for property on which to build new wind
farms.42 In the United States, many wind farms are located in the Midwest
because of the region’s “stronger and more reliable” airflow43 and
abundance of Indian reservations. Additionally, much of Indian Country is
located in areas that are beneficial for energy transmission and
transportation.44 Taking all of these considerations in sum, tribal lands offer
wind developers an appealing portfolio of benefits that are often hard to
pass up.
Osage Wind, LLC45 (“Osage Wind”), a developer, caught wind of these
potential benefits and leased more than 8000 acres from surface owners in

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. United States v. Osage Wind, LLC, 871 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (mem.).
42. See Bethany C. Sullivan, Note, Changing Winds: Reconfiguring the Legal
Framework for Renewable-Energy Development in Indian Country, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 823,
825 (2010) (discussing why tribal lands are well-suited for wind projects).
43. Kayla J. Cawood, Note, The Potential for Production: Regulating Oklahoma’s Wind
Estate and Encouraging Sustainable Wind Energy Development, 41 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
201, 204 (2016).
44. Sullivan, supra note 42, at 826.
45. Osage Wind, 871 F.3d at 1081 n.1 (explaining that Osage Wind, LLC is wholly
owned by Defendant Enel Kansas, LLC, which is wholly owned by Defendant Enel Green
Power North America, Inc.).
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Osage County, Oklahoma, to build a commercial operation. 46 After learning
of the wind developer’s plans, the United States and the Osage Minerals
Council filed suit in 2011 (the 2011 lawsuit) in an attempt to halt
construction.47 The Tribe and the federal government feared that Osage
Wind’s plans would restrict access to the mineral estate and impede the
Tribe’s mineral production.48 At trial, however, the court ruled in favor of
the wind developer because the Tribe lacked evidence that its mineral
lessees had plans to use the mineral estate in a way that conflicted with the
wind developer’s construction plans. 49 Despite the challenges brought by
the 2011 lawsuit, the wind developer was allowed to proceed with the
Osage County project.
Three years after the 2011 lawsuit, Osage Wind began the excavation
work required to construct concrete foundations for the wind turbines. 50
During the construction process, Osage Wind dug large holes and extracted
rock from the ground.51 Specifically, Osage Wind dug holes ten feet deep
and sixty feet wide and filled them with cement.52 Next, Osage Wind
crushed the small extracted rocks and used them as backfill around the
concrete foundations.53 The larger rocks were left on the surface, next to the
construction sites.54
Two months after Osage Wind began excavation, the United States filed
suit on behalf of the Tribe, seeking an injunction to stop the excavation
process.55 The United States claimed the wind developer’s actions
constituted “mining” as defined by 25 C.F.R. § 211.3, which requires a
mineral lease from the Osage Nation.56 After learning that Osage Wind had
already begun excavation, the United States amended its complaint to seek
damages instead of an injunction. 57
The district court was not persuaded by the United States’ argument, and
it accordingly granted summary judgment for the wind developer.58 In
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 1083.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1084.
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reaching its holding, the district court concluded that Osage Wind’s actions
did not fall within the DOI’s definition of mining, meaning the developer
was not required to obtain a mineral lease from the Tribe. 59 The district
court rationalized its holding by establishing that minerals must be
“commercialized” to constitute mining under 25 C.F.R. § 211.3. 60
According to the district court, mining encompasses only activities with a
“commercial mineral development purpose” and not activities that
“incidentally encounter[] minerals in connection with surface construction
activities.”61
On the last day to appeal the district court’s decision, the United States
informed the Tribe that it would not appeal. 62 Rushed by the quick deadline,
the Osage Minerals Council (OMC) immediately filed a motion to intervene
as a matter of right and a notice of appeal. 63 As later shown by the Tenth
Circuit’s holding64 and the Supreme Court’s denial of a petition for a writ of
certiorari, the OMC’s efforts were vital in protecting the Tribe’s property
interest.65
Nevertheless, at the Tenth Circuit, the question before the court was
whether “a large-scale excavation project . . . constituted ‘mining’ under the
pertinent federal regulations that address mineral development on Indian
land.”66
III. Discussion of the Case
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed two procedural issues before
reaching the merits of the case.67 First, the court found that the OMC’s
appeal was proper even though the council was not formally joined to the
lower court proceedings.68 In addition, the court found that the OMC’s

59. Id.
60. Id. at 1089.
61. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Osage Wind, 871 F.3d 1078 (No.
17-1237), 2018 WL 6382961, at *4.
62. Osage Wind, 871 F.3d at 1084.
63. Id.
64. Another Indian Law Case in Limbo as High Court Turns to Trump Again, supra
note 8.
65. Osage Wind, 871 F.3d 1078.
66. Id. at 1081.
67. Id. at 1084.
68. Id.
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claim was not barred by res judicata via the 2011 lawsuit because the claim
was not ripe for review in 2011.69
After discussing the procedural claims, the Tenth Circuit addressed
whether Osage Wind’s actions could be considered mining under 25 C.F.R.
§ 211.3.70 As a means of providing context, the court began its analysis by
discussing the wind developer’s specific activities before addressing the
federal regulations. Osage Wind began the excavation process by
“remov[ing] rock sediment and soil from the ground, creating large holes
into which it could pour a cement foundation.” 71 The wind developer then
“sorted the extracted rock . . . into small and large pieces, and then crushed
the smaller pieces so they would be the proper size for backfilling the
holes.”72 Once this process was complete, Osage Wind put the “bigger rock
pieces adjacent to the backfilled excavation sites.” 73 These steps allowed
Osage Wind to add “structural support” to the turbine foundations. 74
After providing factual context, the Tenth Circuit examined the district
court’s commercialization requirement.75 Because the text of 25 C.F.R. §
211.3 does not mention the term “commercialization,” the appellate court
dismissed the district court’s requirement. 76 Unpersuaded by the court’s
logic, the Tenth Circuit instead focused on the phrase “mineral
development” under the § 211.3 definition of mining, as opposed to
commercialization, to analyze Osage Wind’s actions.77
To decide whether or not Osage Wind’s actions constituted mineral
development, the court turned to the Indian canons of construction for help
with deciphering the phrase.78 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged prior
precedent, stating it was “cognizant of the long-established principle that
ambiguity in laws designed to favor the Indians ought ‘to be liberally
construed’ in the Indians’ favor.”79 The Indian canons of construction apply
when regulations and laws are enacted for the purpose of advancing tribal
interests. Here, the DOI’s regulations were promulgated to “protect Indian

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1087.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1089.
Id.
Id. at 1090.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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mineral resources and ‘maximize [Indians’] best economic interests.” 80
Thus, because the regulations were passed for the benefit of the Indian
tribes, the Tenth Circuit properly relied on the canons to reach its
conclusion.
Applying the canons directly to 25 C.F.R. § 211.3, the text of the
regulation states mining “includ[es] but [is] not limited to: opencast work,
underground work, and in-situ leaching directed to severance and treatment
of minerals.”81 The Tenth Circuit honed in on the phrase “directed to
severance and treatment of minerals,” finding that this phrase requires
“acting upon the minerals to exploit [them].” 82 Applying this interpretation
to the facts of the case, the Tenth Circuit determined that Osage Wind
“act[ed] upon the minerals to exploit [them]” when the developer crushed
the small rocks to make backfill. 83 The court found the developer’s crushing
activities to be of great importance. While merely displacing the minerals
during digging would have likely produced a different outcome, crushing
the rocks and using the materials as support constituted mineral
development.84 The canons of construction helped the court adopt this
broad definition of mining by allowing it to construe 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 in
the light most favorable to the Osage Nation. 85 Under this rationale, Osage
Wind should have obtained a mineral lease from the Tribe before beginning
development.86
Though the Tenth Circuit’s definition of mining was broad, it was not
without limits. The court made sure to note that “merely encountering or
incidentally disrupting mineral materials” does not fall within the definition
of mining nor would it trigger a requirement for a mineral lease from the
Tribe. 87 As such, “the simple removal of dirt” would be excluded from the
lease requirement.88 Interestingly, however, the Tenth Circuit’s inclusion of
the disclaimer that the wind developer’s actions did “not fit nicely with
traditional notions of ‘mining’ as [the] term is commonly understood”
acknowledges that its decision was unconventional. 89
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. (citing 25 C.F.R. § 211.1 (2016)).
25 C.F.R. § 211.3, quoted in Osage Wind, 871 F.3d at 1091.
Osage Wind, 871 F.3d at 1091.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1092.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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After the Tenth Circuit ruled for the Tribe, Osage Wind petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.90 The two questions on petition for
writ of certiorari were:
(1) [w]hether the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the
appeal filed by a nonparty when the nonparty did not participate
in any capacity in the district court proceedings; . . . (2) whether
the Tenth Circuit improperly invoked the Indian canon of
construction to deprive surface-estate owners who are members
or successors-in-interest to Indian tribe members of important
property rights by overriding clear regulatory language for the
express purpose of favoring the economic interests of an Indian
tribe without examining congressional intent.91
In May of 2018, the Supreme Court asked the Office of the Solicitor
General to submit briefing in the case.92 Seven months later, the Solicitor
General filed an amicus brief expressing the views of the United States. 93
This brief urged the Court to deny the petition, despite the fact that two
earlier amici briefs urged the Court to grant it. 94 The brief commented
specifically on the fact that Osage Wind had not identified a circuit court
conflict that warranted review regarding the DOI regulations—because one
did not exist.95 The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court “should
follow its usual ‘practice of waiting for a conflict to develop’” before
addressing this matter.96

90. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Osage Wind, 871 F.3d 1078 (No. 17-1237),
2018 WL 1182776, at *i.
91. Id.
92. Lenzy Krehbiel-Burton, U.S. Supreme Court Invites Solicitor General to Submit
Brief in Osage Wind Case, OSAGE NEWS (May 14, 2018), http://www.osagenews.org/en/
article/2018/05/14/us-supreme-court-invites-solicitor-general-to-submit-brief-in-osage-windcase/.
93. Osage Wind, LLC v. Osage Mineral Council, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.
scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/osage-wind-llc-v-osage-mineral-council/ (last visited Jan.
12, 2019).
94. Lenzy Krehbiel-Burton, SCOTUS Declines to Hear Osage Wind Case, OSAGE NEWS
(Jan. 7, 2019), http://www.osagenews.org/en/article/2019/01/07/scotus-declines-hear-osagewind-case/ [hereinafter SCOTUS Declines to Hear Osage Wind Case] (stating that the
American Wind Energy Association and Osage County Farm Bureau submitted amicus
briefs encouraging the Court to grant the petition).
95. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 61, at 17.
96. Id. at 18.
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Shortly thereafter, on January 7, 2019, the Supreme Court denied the
petition for a writ of certiorari.97 The Supreme Court’s action leaves the
Tenth Circuit’s holding in place.98 Consequently, the Osage Nation will
likely be in a position to collect damages caused by the wind developer’s
mining activities.99
IV. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit properly held for the Osage Nation and protected the
Tribe’s property interests. Furthermore, although indirectly, the Supreme
Court’s denial of a writ of certiorari affirms this conclusion. The Tenth
Circuit was correct in relying on the Indian canons of construction because
the phrase “mineral development” within the DOI’s definition of mining
was ambiguous. It required more than a superficial analysis to determine
what actions fall into this characterization. The court correctly protected the
Tribe’s property interest because the rocks that Osage Wind used for
backfilling the construction site belonged to the Osage Nation. For future
projects, the Tenth Circuit’s ruling serves to remind developers to
familiarize themselves with the relevant permitting and leasing
requirements—and undergo appropriate discussions and gain approvals—
before beginning a wind project on tribal land.
A. The Use of the Indian Canons of Construction
The court’s use of the Indian canons of construction was appropriate here
because the phrase “mineral development” needed further clarification. The
Indian canons of construction allow courts to read statutes and treaties in
favor of Indian tribes, 100 but there are qualifications to their application.
The canons are typically used where a tribe is “a party to a treaty or statute
passed by Congress.”101 Courts originally used the canons to compensate
for unequal bargaining power between Indian tribes and the federal
government at the time that many of the statutes and treaties were
enacted.102 The purpose of these canons, however, has shifted over time.
The canons are now used to illustrate the fiduciary relationship between the
federal government and Indian tribes. 103 Initially, the canons only applied to
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Osage Wind, LLC v. Osage Mineral Council, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (mem.).
Press Release, Fredericks Peebles & Morgan LLP, supra note 24.
SCOTUS Declines to Hear Osage Wind Case, supra note 94.
Tenth Circuit Takes Expansive View of the Term “Mining”, supra note 34.
Moschovidis, supra note 35, at 193.
Id.
Blurton, supra note 1, at 41.
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treaties, 104 but the Supreme Court later established that the canons applied
to federal statutes through its holding in Choate v. Trapp.105
Before discussing the ambiguity of the regulation, it is important to
ascertain whether the canons should have been invoked based on the
purpose of the regulations. The Department of the Interior promulgated 25
C.F.R. §§ 211.3 and 214.7 to “protect [tribal] mineral resources and
‘maximize [the] [Indians]’ best economic interests.’”106 Because the
regulations were created to benefit the Tribe, the Tenth Circuit was well
within its limits to rely on the canons.
As a practical matter, the canons apply only when the text of a statute or
treaty is ambiguous.107 Charles F. Wilkinson, an Indian law scholar and
professor, once commented that “[i]f Indians are involved, you should . . .
read [the] laws with a heavy bias in favor of . . . tribal prerogatives.” 108 If
Indian rights are created or expanded, courts should read the text of the
regulation broadly.109 Alternatively, if a party is attempting to limit a tribe’s
rights, courts should read the text narrowly in favor of the tribe. 110
There are some circumstances in which the Indian canons of construction
do not apply. For instance, the canons should not be used in litigation where
one party is a tribe and the other party consists of a group of tribal
members.111 In this scenario, the canons are of no value because there are
tribal members on both sides of the litigation. In United States v. Osage
Wind, LLC,112 however, the litigation involved a private non-Indian wind
developer and an Indian tribe. Further, the canons should not be used where
the text of the statute or regulation is easily understood. Numerous courts
have held that the canons should be used “only when the plain text of [the]
document is unclear.”113
Addressing the ambiguity of 25 C.F.R. § 211.3, the canons proved
crucial to determine whether Osage Wind’s actions could be classified as
104. Id. at 42.
105. Id.
106. United States v. Osage Wind, LLC, 871 F.3d 1078, 1090 (10th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (mem.) (citing 25 C.F.R. § 211.1 (2016)).
107. See id.
108. Blurton, supra note 1, at 39 (emphasis added).
109. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 33, United States v. Wind Farm, LLC, 871 F.3d 1078
(10th Cir. 2017) (Nos. 15-5121, 16-5022), 2016 WL 2347320, at *33 (citations omitted).
110. Id.
111. Blurton, supra note 1, at 46 (citing Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425
U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976)).
112. 871 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (mem.).
113. Moschovidis, supra note 35, at 194 (emphasis added).
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mineral development within the definition of mining. On one hand,
“mining” is arguably clear. Critics of the Tenth Circuit’s decision state that
mining is plainly defined as “the process of extracting from the earth the
rough ore or mineral; that is, the act or business of making mines or
working them.”114 To the layperson, mining is generally understood and
unambiguous. Most would likely agree with the Merriam-Webster
definition of mining, which states that mining is “the process or business of
working mines.”115 It is hard to imagine that Osage Wind’s actions
constituted mining under commonly accepted terms. Still, although mining
may seem clear, the phrase “mineral development” is not as black and
white.
The text of the regulation provides important insight. The regulation
notes that “mineral development” “includ[es], but [is] not limited to:
opencast work, underground work, and in-situ leaching directed to
severance and treatment of minerals.” 116 The words “including, but not
limited to” are crucial. 117 The regulation provides a list of examples, but the
list is not exhaustive. Although the list provides guidance, the list does not
include the actions that Osage Wind took when building the concrete
foundations. The list does not state anything about digging holes,
excavating ground, or crushing rock to use as backfill. Because these
actions are not enumerated, and thus not clearly included or excluded, the
Tenth Circuit properly relied on the canons to determine whether Osage
Wind’s actions constituted “mineral development.” Taking the phrase in a
literal sense, Osage Wind “developed” the minerals when they excavated
the rock and crushed the smaller rocks for backfill. Consequently, the Tenth
Circuit’s holding is supported by a practical understanding of the text.
Although both parties have valid arguments about the ambiguity of
“mining” and “mineral development” under 25 C.F.R. § 211.3, the court
appropriately relied on the canons to further define the terms. The phrase
“including, but not limited to” required the court to look further to make its
determination that Osage Wind developed the Tribe’s minerals. Ultimately,
114. Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners by
Osage County Farm Bureau, Inc. et al. at 13–14, Osage Wind, 871 F.3d 1078 (No. 17-1237),
2018 WL 1666863, at *13–14 (citing 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 4 (Westlaw, Mar.
2018 update)).
115. Mining, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mining
(last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
116. 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 (2018) (emphasis added), quoted in Osage Wind, 871 F.3d at
1082.
117. Osage Wind, 871 F.3d at 1082.
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under 25 C.F.R. § 211.3, Osage Wind acted upon the Tribe’s resources
without a mineral lease.
B. The Tribe’s Real Property
By holding for the Tribe, the Tenth Circuit protected the Tribe’s property
interests because the backfill materials belonged to the Osage Nation. The
Osage Nation holds title to the mineral estate under the Osage Act. With
title, the Tribe has the choice to develop—or abstain from developing—its
mineral resources. 118 The Osage Nation also has the ability to control the
mining activities that affect the subsurface estate, even if they take place on
the surface.119
The property rights to the minerals are based on the “notion[] that
property consists not of things, but of legal relationships.”120 The
relationships do not focus on the objects themselves; the focus is instead on
the parties involved in the legal transaction. 121 Traditionally, under the ad
coelum doctrine, whoever owned the soil owned “to the sky and to the
depths.”122 This doctrine, however, has been modified by modern property
concepts affecting the transfer, removal, and use of such property
interests.123 Specifically in this case, the Osage Nation’s traditional property
rights were altered when its mineral rights were severed from the surface
rights. After the Osage Act, the Tribe’s property rights stemmed from the
legal relationship created from the severance. Since the time of severance,
the Tribe has held title to the subsurface estate.
Understanding the role that tribes play in the ownership of minerals and
natural resources has not always been easy. 124 For instance, in an 1873
Supreme Court case, the Court held that timber cut on tribal lands belonged
to the federal government instead of the Tribe.125 Although the land itself
belonged to the Tribe, the Court viewed the cut timber as the property of
the federal government.126 The Court’s ruling in this case illustrates the
attitude the federal government had toward tribal property ownership
during that time.
118. Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal
Control over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 544–45 (1994).
119. Id. at 545.
120. Cawood, supra note 43, at 211.
121. Id.
122. EISEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 10 & n.2.
123. Id.
124. See Royster, supra note 118, at 546.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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The Court’s view eventually began to change. Specifically related to
subsurface estates, the DOI and Congress began to formally recognize
tribes as owners of subsurface estates in the 1900s; the Supreme Court
followed suit in 1938.127 The Court recognized the subsurface minerals
were “constituent elements of the land itself” belonging to the Indian
tribes.128 This shift in view of tribal property ownership is noteworthy as it
applies to the present case.
In the context of the Osage Nation, the Osage Act formally recognizes
that all subsurface minerals are the Tribe’s property.129 The phrase “all
minerals” encompasses rights to the “rocks, gravel, oil, gas, and other
minerals.”130 Because “all minerals” expressly includes “rocks,” the rocks
in the present case belonged to the Osage Nation. Osage Wind effectively
took the Tribe’s property and used it for its own gain without permission
from the Tribe. By using the rocks for backfill, the wind developers
“trespassed on the Osage mineral estate, in violation of law[,] . . . caus[ing]
damage . . . [and placing] a continuing trespass [that] diminishes . . . the use
and enjoyment of the mineral estate.” 131
It is hard to believe that a sophisticated wind developer had no notice
that the Osage Nation held title to the mineral estate; the developer should
have known that all of the minerals therein belonged to the Tribe. Osage
Wind’s use of the Tribe’s rock for backfill denied the Osage Nation a
property right that every other property owner enjoys.132 This property
right—preventing someone from taking and using another’s property
without permission or payment—is fundamental. 133
The Tenth Circuit’s holding recognizes that the Tribe was deprived of
this right and illustrates a balance between the interests of wind developers
and the protection of tribal property rights. The Supreme Court’s recent
denial of the petition for writ of certiorari implicitly reinforces the notion
that the Tribe was the rightful owner of its minerals. After the Supreme
Court’s denial, the Tribe commented that they were “pleased that the
United States has left in place the Tenth Circuit decision that the OMC, like
127. Id. at 546–47.
128. Id. at 547 (citing United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111 (1938)).
129. Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, United States v.
Osage Wind, LLC, 871 F.3d 1081 (2017) (No. 17-1237), 2018 WL 1705593 at *6.
130. Id. at 7.
131. Another Indian Law Case in Limbo as High Court Turns to Trump Again, supra
note 8.
132. Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 129, at 4.
133. Id. at 2.
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other property owners, has the right to obtain compensation for use of its
land.”134
C. This Requirement in Practice
In practice, it is reasonable to expect developers to communicate with
Indian tribes to satisfy proper leasing requirements before beginning
excavation work. If Osage Wind had fulfilled this expectation, it would
have respected the Osage Nation’s property rights while avoiding this
litigation and all of its attendant costs. As a general matter, Indian tribes
play a unique role in creating “innovative approaches” in the development
of renewable energy solutions because of their sovereignty and available
resources.135 Wind developers should recognize this and communicate with
Indian tribes in order to foster workable relationships in the future.
Numerous wind industry groups have stressed the importance of fully
investigating leasing and regulatory requirements before beginning the
development of a new wind project. The American Wind Energy
Association (AWEA) has stated that a developer should consider certain
factors before beginning a project, including “the amount of wind in a given
area, land rights, government permits, transmitting the energy generated, a
buyer for the energy, and financing for the project.” 136 On its website, the
AWEA makes clear that the wind industry is “carefully regulated” and that
land rights and government permits should be investigated in the planning
phases before construction.137
Another wind industry proponent, Windustry.org, supports the guidance
outlined by the AWEA and recommends that developers familiarize
themselves with “securing permits and . . . financing.”138 It is further
recommended that developers meet with permitting authorities to discuss
requirements and applications.139 Both of these consumer-friendly websites
explicitly mention the importance of securing permits and becoming
familiar with land rights. Windustry.org also provides developers with a
start-to-finish guide for beginning new projects, discussing the permitting
134. Press Release, Fredericks Peebles & Morgan LLP, supra note 24.
135. Sullivan, supra note 42, at 826.
136. Cawood, supra note 43, at 222 (emphasis added).
137. Project Development, AWEA, https://www.awea.org/policy-and-issues/projectdevelopment (last visited Jan. 6, 2018).
138. Lisa Daniels, Community Wind Toolbox Chapter 2: Development Overview and
Checklist, WINDUSTRY (Jan. 16, 2008), http://www.windustry.org/community_wind_
toolbox-2-development-overview-and-checklist (emphasis added).
139. Id.
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process at length. 140 These resources make it easy for developers to identify
their requirements and satisfy them before entering the construction phases
of development.
Therefore, it is not far-fetched to expect wind developers to become
acquainted with the permitting and leasing requirements when planning a
new project. Because of the Osage Nation’s sovereignty and individual
government, Osage Wind should have had a heightened awareness of the
need to investigate the Tribe’s requirements and satisfy them before
beginning construction. Both the AWEA and Windustry.org provide the
basic level of care that developers should satisfy when planning new
projects—merely securing the necessary permits. If Osage Wind did its due
diligence in investigating the Tribe’s requirements and communicating with
tribal leaders, it is quite likely that United States v. Osage Wind, LLC141
never would have happened. Going forward, this case reiterates that wind
developers, arguably the experts in the wind industry, must investigate,
research, and satisfy their requirements before beginning construction.
The Osage Nation’s attorney, Jeffrey Rasmussen, commented on Osage
Wind’s actions and lack of due diligence before beginning the project. 142
Rasmussen noted that Osage Wind “didn’t have the Minerals Council’s
consent . . . and now they’ve invested millions of dollars when it’s fairly
obvious they needed a lease.”143 Rasmussen cautioned other developers to
“be careful . . . because [they] don’t want to get in the situation these guys
are in.”144
By serving as an example of the consequences of proceeding without a
lease, this case will hopefully eliminate similar problems with developers in
the future. The Tenth Circuit’s ruling signals that courts will likely be
unsympathetic if a developer does not conduct proper diligence before
beginning a project.145 This lack of sympathy is especially true where tribal

140. Lisa Daniels, Community Wind Toolbox Chapter 6: Permitting Basics, WINDUSTRY
(Dec. 15, 2007), http://www.windustry.org/community_wind_toolbox_6_permitting_basics.
141. 871 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (mem.).
142. Kyle Hinchey, Appeals Court Reverses Judge’s Decision Allowing Wind Developers
to Dig on Osage Land, TULSA WORLD (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.tulsaworld.com/news/
courts/appeals-court-reverses-judge-s-decision-allowing-wind-developers-to/article_2a6eab
9f-0a8c-5c72-aa02-caee53f8e14a.html.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. WilmerHale, Court Holds Project Construction Constitutes “Mining” on Tribal
Lands, JDSUPRA (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/court-holds-projectconstruction-84462/.
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lands are involved.146 Legal requirements are everchanging; accordingly,
developers should be extremely proactive in ascertaining their requirements
in the planning phases of production. 147
D. Minimal Implications
After the Tenth Circuit’s decision, questions began to circulate regarding
how far the Indian canons of construction could stretch and what
implications would come from this ruling. The American Wind Energy
Association attacked the ruling as affecting the rights of surface owners and
affecting wind developers wanting to build new projects on tribal lands. 148
As a whole, however, the implications from United States v. Osage Wind,
LLC149 are minimal. The Tenth Circuit’s decision will serve only to protect
tribal property interests and remind wind developers of their duties and
obligations. The day-to-day life of surface owners and wind developers will
remain largely unaffected, and the economic benefit of wind projects will
likely remain unstifled.
Although criticized by some, the holding in United States v. Osage Wind,
LLC150 will have “little to no effect” on surface owners in Osage County
and beyond.151 Osage Wind specifically criticized the Tenth Circuit’s
holding in its Response to Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
stating that the canons of construction are improper where they are
“invoked to expand the rights of a tribe by judicial fiat, particularly when
that is accomplished at the expense of private land owners by adopting ‘a
contorted construction’ of clear text.” 152 Thus, to dispel any related
criticisms, it is important to address how this case will affect surface
owners.
The DOI’s de minimis exception to the mining requirement outlined in
25 C.F.R. § 211.3 will encompass most surface activities. 153 The de minimis
146. Id.
147. Id.; see also Summer L. Carmack, United States v. Osage Wind, LLC, 871 F.3d
1078 (10th Cir. 2017), PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. (CASE SUMMARIES) 1, 6–7 (2017-2018),
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1570&context=plrlr.
148. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Wind Energy Association in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 10.
149. 871 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (mem.).
150. Id.
151. Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 129, at 27.
152. Andrew Westney, Wind Farm Cos. Tell Justices Feds Wrong on Tribal Appeal,
LAW360 (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1113138/wind-farm-cos-telljustices-feds-wrong-on-tribal-appeal.
153. 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 (2016).
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exception does not require a mineral lease if the excavation is of common
materials less than 5000 cubic yards per year.154 This exception
encompasses most “simple removal[s] of dirt.”155 In fact, the Tenth Circuit
specifically noted that “building a basement or swimming pool necessarily
involves digging a hole in the ground, displacing rock and soil in the
process,”156 but these actions are protected by the de minimis exception. If a
certain activity falls within this exception—and most will—surface owners
need not obtain a mineral lease from the Tribe. This exception serves to
reassure surface owners that they will continue to maintain “virtually
uninhibited use of their land[].”157
Rebuking the Tenth Circuit decision, the American Wind Energy
Association argued that the holding conflicted with the Osage Act. 158 In
practice, this holding actually goes hand-in-hand with the Act. As stated
previously, the Osage Act references the free use “of the surface estate.” 159
Under the Tenth Circuit’s holding, surface owners still retain free use of the
surface estate and maintain their property rights, which are the same as
every other landowner.160 Surface owners may reside, work, camp, picnic,
graze, and take part in all other related activities that landowners enjoy on
their property. These actions are not unsettled by this decision.
Even if a surface owner wanted to develop and excavate his land beyond
what is appropriate under the de minimis exception, he could likely still do
so by obtaining a mineral lease from the Tribe. In enacting both the mineral
lease requirement and the de minimis exception, the federal government
attempted to balance the rights of both the surface owner and the Osage
Nation. Requiring a surface owner to obtain a lease from the Tribe for the
excavation of large amounts of minerals illustrates respect for tribal
property rights.
The rationale behind the mineral lease requirement for large amounts of
minerals is simple: developing minerals in large quantities goes beyond the
basic use of the surface estate and can negatively impact the Indian tribe’s
154. Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 129, at 27.
155. Id.
156. United States v. Osage Wind, LLC, 871 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (mem.).
157. Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 129, at 27.
158. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Wind Energy Association in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 5, 10.
159. Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 129, at 27.
160. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 22, United States v. Osage Wind, LLC, 871 F.3d 1081
(2017) (Nos. 16-5022, 15-5121), 2016 WL 3922731 at *22.
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mineral resources. 161 Therefore, it is logical for a surface owner planning a
large project to ask the Tribe for permission before beginning construction.
The application and approval of a mineral lease ensures that both involved
parties are afforded proper respect. Since surface owners can still ask the
Tribe for permission, their rights are largely unaffected by this ruling.
In the present case, Osage Wind’s actions fell outside of the de minimis
exception because the Tenth Circuit viewed the wind farm as a “single
integrated project unified by proximity of time, space, and purpose,” which
allowed the court to view the eighty-four holes in the aggregate.162 This
fact-specific interpretation is unlikely to restrict the future activities of
surface owners or their lessees who may dig holes or build smaller
structures on the surface.163
Along with the unchanged surface rights, the Osage Nation’s right to the
mineral estate also remains unchanged. This ruling does not provide the
Osage Minerals Council, the Osage Nation, or the Bureau of Indian Affairs
with any right or power that the individual entities did not already have by
holding title to the mineral estate.164 This holding provides an excellent
example of judicial interpretation aimed at striking a balance between the
rights of each party.
E. Outside the Tenth Circuit
The outcome of United States v. Osage Wind, LLC165 ensures that tribal
property rights are protected within the Tenth Circuit and in other states
across the nation. When asked about the effects of this case, Osage
Minerals Council Chairman Everett Waller stated that this case is a
“substantial victory for tribes, and more generally for mineral property
rights owners.”166 This quote demonstrates that this holding reaches beyond
merely the Osage Nation.
The Tenth Circuit is comprised of Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming, and this holding is binding on federal
courts within this jurisdiction. 167 The effect of the Tenth Circuit’s holding,
however, is not limited to tribal wind dealings within this specific
161. Id.
162. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 61, at 18–19.
163. Id. at 19.
164. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 160, at 22.
165. 871 F.3d 1078.
166. Press Release, Fredericks Peebles & Morgan LLP, supra note 24.
167. WilmerHale, supra note 145 (defining the Tenth Circuit as Colorado, Kansas, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming).
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jurisdiction. In fact, this holding could affect tribal land outside of the Tenth
Circuit, land managed by the government, and industries other than wind.
There are substantial Indian lands in other states, including California,
Arizona, Washington, and Montana.168 Moreover, Indian tribes are the third
largest owners of mineral resources in the United States.169 Because wind
projects are so common on tribal lands, it is likely that this factual situation
could arise in other jurisdictions. 170 This holding will serve as persuasive
evidence and provide an example of how to address these issues in courts in
other jurisdictions analyzing similar factual scenarios.
Beyond just tribal interests, this holding could also protect land where
the federal government manages the surface estate. Today, the federal
government manages the mineral estate of approximately 755 million acres
of land in the United States.171 The American Wind Energy Association,
taking note of this, stated that the Tenth Circuit’s ruling “could also be
extended to activities outside of tribal land, thus requiring a lease for any
activity that involves the digging of holes on land where the Federal
government manages the mineral estate.” 172 Although 25 C.F.R. §§ 211.3
and 214.7 apply specifically to tribal lands, these regulations are similar to
other federal regulations.173 In the future, courts may look to this holding to
determine whether related actions on federally managed lands would
require a mineral lease, thus protecting these lands. 174 Any holding that
improves early communication between parties whose interests may or may
not converge is bound to improve outcomes on both procedural and
substantive levels.
This ruling could also affect industries beyond the wind industry
working within tribal or federal lands. For instance, the regulation “at
issue . . . has general application to all leases and permits for the
development of tribal mineral resources, including oil and gas, coal,
geothermal, and solid minerals.”175 It is natural to assume that this holding
could apply to these other energy industries. Because of its persuasive

168. Id.
169. Royster, supra note 118, at 542–43.
170. WilmerHale, supra note 145.
171. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Wind Energy Association in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 9–10.
172. Id. at 9.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. WilmerHale, supra note 145.
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nature, United States v. Osage Wind, LLC176 will promote unity and
consistency in other jurisdictions addressing tribal wind issues, federally
managed lands, and related issues in other energy contexts.
F. Economic Benefit from Wind Projects
Indian tribes depend on wind projects for economic gain and energy goal
attainment. Indian nations feel immense benefit from wind developments
because these projects create new jobs and stimulate the economy. 177
Likewise, implementing wind energy projects allows Indian tribes to
diversify their energy portfolios and meet their clean energy goals. 178 From
an economic standpoint, the Tenth Circuit’s holding has been criticized as a
potential hindrance to tribal economies and the abilities of tribes to meet
their clean energy goals. Although critics pit tribal economic interests and
tribal property interests against each other, these needs can peacefully
coexist if balanced correctly. The Tenth Circuit illustrated this by
harmonizing these interests with its holding in United States v. Osage Wind,
LLC.179
From an economic standpoint, the development of wind projects on
tribal lands is particularly beneficial for Indian tribes. 180 Many reservations
suffer economically, often struggling to provide core services for tribal
members.181 For instance, it is common for reservations to “lack adequate
health care, housing, and law enforcement services.”182 Wind energy serves
as a solution to these struggles by providing an economic boost to these
communities. Wind energy stimulates tribal economies because wind
developers pay property owners for their resources. 183 Further, these
projects bring with them the potential for the creation of new jobs. 184 In
Oklahoma alone, tribal projects created more than 8000 jobs in 2017. 185
Further, developers brought money and revenue into the state by investing
more than six billion dollars in Oklahoma during the first decade of wind

176. 871 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 784 (mem.) (2019).
177. See Sullivan, supra note 42, at 825–26.
178. Id.
179. 871 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (mem.).
180. See Sullivan, supra note 42, at 826–27.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 826.
183. See id. at 826–27.
184. Id.
185. Wind Energy in Oklahoma, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, https://www.awea.org/Awea/
media/Resources/StateFactSheets/Oklahoma.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
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energy alone.186 Wind energy projects are crucial to revitalizing tribal
communities and creating new waves of opportunity. But while all of this is
true, property rights are equally important, particularly given the autonomy,
self-determination, and sovereignty that the right to defining, balancing, and
evaluating them upholds.
The American Wind Energy Association feared that this ruling, if left in
place, would hinder wind developments on tribal lands because developers
would fear that working with tribes would lead to similar costly litigation
and intensive permitting requirements. 187 Ironically, though, even though
they are both proponents of the wind industry, Osage Wind argued the
opposite—stating that the Tenth Circuit misapplied the Indian canons of
construction by focusing too heavily on maximizing economic gain for the
Tribe. 188 Despite being proponents of the wind industry, Osage Wind’s
argument directly contradicts the AWEA’s argument regarding economic
development. Nonetheless, economic effects will likely be minimal.
While a slight possibility exists that this case will deter some wind
developers from working with Indian tribes, this trivial risk is not enough to
outweigh the immense benefits that stem from this holding. Because tribal
lands are so highly sought after by wind developers due to their portfolio of
benefits, it is not likely that this ruling—which simply reminds developers
to act proactively during the planning process—will deter them from
working with tribes altogether. Were that the case, there would never have
been any tribal/non-tribal partnerships within Indian Country, a supposition
that modern realities bely. Further, any future surface estate lessee planning
to build a wind farm could presumably avoid a similar result by purchasing
backfill material and importing it to the construction site as opposed to
using the tribe’s minerals.189
Like many tough questions involving allegedly competing rights, the
interests here required a balancing act. The Tenth Circuit properly balanced

186. KYLE D. DEAN & RUSSELL R. EVANS, ECON. IMPACT GROUP, THE STATEWIDE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN OKLAHOMA: AN INPUT-OUTPUT
ANALYSIS BY
PARTS
EXAMINATION
4
(2014),
http://windcoalition.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/Oklahoma-Wind-Study-FINAL-26-March-20141.pdf.
187. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Wind Energy Association in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 10.
188. Westney, supra note 152 (citations omitted) (stating that the court interpreted the
Department of the Interior’s regulations “for the purpose of maximizing economic gain to an
Indian tribe, not for its intended purpose of construing ambiguous statutory text”).
189. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 61, at 18.
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the Tribe’s property interests with the Tribe’s interests in stimulating
economic growth.
V. Conclusion
Although some have criticized United States v. Osage Wind, LLC,190 the
Tenth Circuit correctly relied on the Indian canons of construction to
protect the Osage Nation’s real property interests from infringement by
Osage Wind. From a policy perspective, it is logical to expect wind
developers in the future to investigate and research their requirements
before beginning construction—especially where tribes are involved. The
implications from this case on surface owners will be minimal because of
the carved-out exception for smaller projects. This case provides a template
for when it is proper to apply the Indian canons of construction in similar
factual scenarios that arise throughout the United States. The Tenth
Circuit’s holding properly balanced the interests of both parties and allows
for future protection of tribal property interests.

190. See Westney, supra note 152.
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